Driving a hard bargain

Policymakers and scholars are deeply divided on the purpose and effectiveness of sanctions, but recent work has given attention to the strategy of using positive sanctions or incentives. This study investigates the conditions under which the U.S. uses a punitive sanctions policy (indicated by all negative sanctions) or an engagement policy (indicated by a mix of positive and negative sanctions). Applying materialist (Schelling, 1960, 1966; Snyder and Diesing, 1977; Axelrod, 1984; Fearon, 1994) and sociological (Schoppa, 1999; Wendt, 2000; Lebow, 2007) bargaining perspectives, this study will consider factors such as the level of target threat, the target's nuclear weapons capability, the extent of international support for sanctions, and the relationship between the U.S. and target. This study analyzes the case studies of the U.S-led sanctions against Iraq (1990-2003), North Korea (1993-present), and Libya (1972-2006).