The rhetoric of law and love: legally (re)defining marriage

In just over one year since United States v. Windsor— the case invalidating sections of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) that defined marriage, for purposes of federal statutes, as the “union of man and woman”— more than a dozen states have had their same-sex marriage bans ruled unconstitutional. This suggests a shift in legal meaning; previously successful arguments against same-sex “marriage” now seem irrational as argumentative ground has shifted. Since favorable rulings redefine “marriage” to include same-sex unions, this thesis analyzes Kitchen v. Herbert, a 2014 legal opinion from the United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit, to understand the rhetorical processes underpinning its redefinitional act. That analysis draws on Kenneth Burke’s theories of entitling and constitutions and discusses the rhetorical concepts of terministic screens, casuistic screens, scope and circumference as key features of the rhetoric of the legal opinions. The findings call for a balancing of deconstructive and conventional approaches to legal discourse.