Accounting--Standards--United States

This study examines two questions: (1) whether the level professional judgment required in the application of accounting standards affects the comparability of financial reporting; (2) whether financial statement preparers exploit the professional judgment in accounting standards in order to engage in earnings management. The study is motivated by former FASB Chair Dennis Beresford's call for simple accounting standards which rely heavily on the exercise of professional judgment and by SEC Chair Arthur Levitt's concerns that managers exploit the flexibility in accounting standards to engage in earnings management. Agency theory is used to develop two hypotheses which predict the conditions under which financial statement preparers exploit the professional judgment allowed in the application of accounting standards in order to manage earnings. Normative arguments are used to develop a third hypothesis about the relationship between the level of professional judgment required to apply accounting standards and the comparability of financial reporting. The study uses an experiment methodology to examine the financial reporting decisions of 111 financial statement preparers in corporations located throughout the United States. Participants are randomly assigned to one of four experimental groups (a control group, a profit-sharing plan group, an information asymmetry group, and a moral hazard group). The study's results support the hypothesis that there is less comparability in financial reporting when accounting standards rely heavily on the exercise of professional judgment than when standards place fewer demands on professional judgment. The findings also provide some support for the idea that moral hazard conditions interact with the level of professional judgment required in the application of accounting standards to affect the reporting decisions of financial statement preparers. However, the male financial statement preparers in this study reacted differently than their female counterparts when faced with moral hazard conditions.

Auditor independence has been a long-standing issue for regulators resulting in numerous studies on the subject on how to enhance it and numerous rules that attempt to ensure it (e.g. Cohen Report 1978; ASR 250 1978; SEC Rule 2-01 2000). One of regulators' most recent attempts to shore up auditor independence is evident in the provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). As a test of two competing theories of auditor independence, and to determine whether SOX mandates have successfully enhanced financial reporting quality, I examine post-SOX changes in non-audit fees (as a proxy for changes in quasi-rents) and the extent of changes in two measures of financial reporting quality. Results suggest that SOX mandates have been effective, and that the proposition of DeAngelo (1981b) that non-audit services may impair auditor independence may more-closely describe the relationship between changes in quasi-rents and changes in financial reporting quality than does the theory of Lee and Gu (1998). Further, supplemental analyses suggest that, as proposed by the theories, the amount of low-balling is positively related to the amount of quasi-rents.