Model
Digital Document
Publisher
Florida Atlantic University
Description
A significant portion of the self is constructed from our actions and the roles
to which they correspond. Although many of our social roles are enacted regularly,
some may lay dormant, yet still influence one's self-concept. We propose that there
are systematic differences in mental representation between these inactive roles and
more active roles. Specifically, inactive roles should be more likely to be construed
in high-level terms, while active roles should be more likely to be construed in lowlevel
terms. Experiment 1 found that for inactive roles, participants displayed an
implicit construal preference for the high-level aspects of the role. Experiment 2
provided evidence that an implicit measure of construal was necessary in order to tap
these unconscious associations. These experiments support the hypothesis that
inactive social roles are mentally represented in a unique manner with respect to more
active roles.
to which they correspond. Although many of our social roles are enacted regularly,
some may lay dormant, yet still influence one's self-concept. We propose that there
are systematic differences in mental representation between these inactive roles and
more active roles. Specifically, inactive roles should be more likely to be construed
in high-level terms, while active roles should be more likely to be construed in lowlevel
terms. Experiment 1 found that for inactive roles, participants displayed an
implicit construal preference for the high-level aspects of the role. Experiment 2
provided evidence that an implicit measure of construal was necessary in order to tap
these unconscious associations. These experiments support the hypothesis that
inactive social roles are mentally represented in a unique manner with respect to more
active roles.
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