Managerial economics

This study examines the effects of epistemic motives and individual social structure (strength of social ties) on individual actions. lt has been suggested that the informal structure of relations that develops within firms affects the actions of individuals
e effects of both epistemic motives and social structure are considered. The findings of this study suggest that information about the epistemic motives of employees can provide insight into the fonnation of the individual social structures and the intrinsic desire of employees to take interdependent or independent actions. The
effects of epistemic motives and individual social structure on individual actions, the
organizing process and the formulation and implementation of strategies are discussed.

Outsourcing has become a significant factor in the U.S. economy over the past two decades. Annual report disclosures made by a firm related to outsourcing are voluntary disclosures. Understanding the determinants and firm performance implications of initial outsourcing annual report disclosures is important to capital market providers, standards developers, and to the firms themselves. I identify and study firms making initial voluntary disclosures of outsourcing in their annual reports on Form 10-K between 1993 and 2003 after they make non-annual report related public disclosures. Specifically, I investigate if determinants of the initial annual report disclosure decision and subsequent performance are associated with the initial disclosure. This study contends managers disclose information related to outsourcing in their annual reports to reduce information asymmetry and to minimize agency costs. I hypothesize and develop a firm-related variable commonly used in agency theory to test this assertion. Signaling theory and voluntary disclosure theory also explain the determinants for firm voluntary outsourcing annual report disclosures. I develop several hypotheses defining determinants potentially associated with the likelihood of initial annual report outsourcing disclosure decisions, and test these determinants using a conditional logistic regression model and a matched-pair group of firms making public outsourcing disclosures but not making annual report disclosure. Using signaling theory, I also develop hypotheses testing if the initial outsourcing annual report disclosure sends a signal regarding future firm performance--specifically testing firm performance measures related to profitability and cash flow. I test these hypotheses using OLS models and the same matched-pair group of firms. I find firms with high levels of debt, high total cost ratios, and high returns on assets are more likely to make initial annual report outsourcing disclosure.

This dissertation investigates the antecedents and consequences to pay disparity between the CEO and non-CEO executives from an equity-based perspective. While the principles of agency theory suggest that CEOs are granted higher compensation packages to better align their motives to those of the firm's shareholders, empirical research has not supported a positive relationship between rising CEO pay and firm performance. Some results even suggest a negative relationship. This dissertation argues that if organizational outcomes are determined by the integrated skills and talents of its dominant coalition, and if the management of a firm's trajectory is a shared process, then, the disparity in rewards between the CEO and those that work closest to him becomes an important area of study.