Corporations -- Growth

Model
Digital Document
Publisher
Florida Atlantic University
Description
I investigate if all-equity firms are a heterogeneous group as it relates to agency costs and accounting quality. All-equity firms are a unique group of firms that choose a “corner solution” as their capital structure. Extant research, supported by well-established theories such as trade-off theory, free cash flow theory, and Jensen’s (1986) control hypothesis, generally conclude that agency conflicts motivate such structure. Research also supports the alternative argument that poor accounting quality makes debt so prohibitive that such firms are driven to this capital structure. I propose that an all-equity structure is not necessarily symptomatic of agency conflicts and poor accounting quality overall. I investigate if different motivations, within an all-equity setting, reflected by free cash flows and growth opportunities, result in different levels of agency cost and accounting quality. By anchoring on theories that link implicit costs of debt to free cash flow levels and growth opportunities, I hypothesize that free cash flows and growth opportunities are strongly linked to the justification or lack thereof for the pursuit of such strategy. I hypothesize and show that firms in the extremes of the free cash flow to growth rate spectrum exhibit significantly different levels of agency cost and accounting quality within the all-equity setting. These results support my main prediction that there exists agency costs and accounting quality differences within the all-equity setting which are associated with free cash flow levels and growth opportunities and that the pessimistic conclusions for pursuing an all-equity strategy reached by prior research should not be generalized to all such firms.
Model
Digital Document
Publisher
Florida Atlantic University
Description
Corporate diversification is a core topic in Financial Economics. The desire to better understand why a firm elects to diversify as opposed to increase in scale is the motivation of this dissertation. To accomplish this goal I test a number of dynamic models of corporate diversification, with similar predictions, to better understand the dynamic choice to diversify. I find that several previously untested models do indeed provide insight as to why a firm would diversify (Essay One). In particular two firm traits, firm talent which I use the proxy of organization capital and asset specificity which I use the proxy of asset tangibility, are strongly related to propensity of the firm to engage in corporate diversification for the first time.