Auditing--Quality control

This paper brings together the auditor quality, asset reliability and firm valuation literatures by examining the role of auditor quality in equity valuation. The study broadly follows the Richardson et al. (2005) categorization of the reliability of accounting accruals of balance sheet components and conjectures that the role of auditor quality in equity valuation is more pronounced when asset reliability is not high. Auditor quality is measured using reputation, industry specialist and tenure metrics. The underlying assumption is that auditor quality enhances the market's perception of firm value; as such, auditor quality may mitigate the cost of security mispricing documented by Richardson et al. (2005) for low or medium reliability accruals. The results of the study provide some support that high quality auditors contribute to the valuation of equity for assets. It is less clear as to whether the value is more pronounced for low or medium reliability assets.

Auditor independence has been a long-standing issue for regulators resulting in numerous studies on the subject on how to enhance it and numerous rules that attempt to ensure it (e.g. Cohen Report 1978; ASR 250 1978; SEC Rule 2-01 2000). One of regulators' most recent attempts to shore up auditor independence is evident in the provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). As a test of two competing theories of auditor independence, and to determine whether SOX mandates have successfully enhanced financial reporting quality, I examine post-SOX changes in non-audit fees (as a proxy for changes in quasi-rents) and the extent of changes in two measures of financial reporting quality. Results suggest that SOX mandates have been effective, and that the proposition of DeAngelo (1981b) that non-audit services may impair auditor independence may more-closely describe the relationship between changes in quasi-rents and changes in financial reporting quality than does the theory of Lee and Gu (1998). Further, supplemental analyses suggest that, as proposed by the theories, the amount of low-balling is positively related to the amount of quasi-rents.