Public private sector cooperation

Regulation of the nonprofit sector is a subject of significant debate in the
academic and professional literature. The debate raises questions about how to regulate the sector in a manner that addresses accountability while preserving the sector’s unique role in society. Central to the debate is the role of self-regulation.
The nonprofit sector is recognized and defended as a distinct third sector in
society. Cultural norms and values differentiate the purpose of the sector from the
governmental and commercial realms. The legal regime secures rights, establishes
organizational structures, and provides tax benefits that enable, reinforce, and protect
participation in nonprofit activities. Nevertheless, government regulation is thought to be
antithetical to sector autonomy, as well as an obstacle to flexibility and innovation. Selfregulation protects the sector’s political independence and its distinctiveness through the cultivation of shared norms, standards, and processes for ethical practices. Although self regulation is considered to be consistent with the autonomous nature of the sector, it is also criticized as a weaker form of regulation. The ability to address regulatory issues expressed in the broader debate is limited by how we frame nonprofit regulation. The problem with advancing our understanding of self-regulation has to do with how we conceptualize nonprofit regulation. Government and self-regulation are conceptualized and studied as distinct options for regulating the sector. Missing in the nonprofit scholarship is a theoretical framework capable of reframing nonprofit regulation as a system of governance that depends on self-regulation. This represents a glaring gap in the research. Neglecting the institutional context that explains the structure and functioning of the nonprofit sector has led to an oversimplification of nonprofit governance. To study the effects of self-regulation on the functioning of the sector, I argue that we must first frame what is relevant about how the nonprofit sector is governed. The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework outlines a systematic approach for analyzing institutions that govern collective endeavors. The objective of this dissertation is to introduce the IAD as an approach for examining self-regulation not as an alternative to government regulation but as an important part of nonprofit governance.

This study explores the connections of public procurement official
perceptions of public-private partnerships and their contracting decisions for
public infrastructure projects. Detailed discussion of previous scholarship and its
focus on policymaking and project evaluation of public-private partnerships
leaves a gap in the public policy process – implementation. Procurement officials
are presented in the role of policy implementers rather than agents in a principalagent
approach. This attempts to address a shortcoming of the description that
these officials do nothing more than purchase. Arguments are put forth that these
officials are given additional levels of discretion when faced with contracting
decisions. Specifically, procurement officials observe that public-private
partnerships provide sets of project consequences. A survey instrument is designed to explore the differences in perceptions
that procurement officials have with respect to public-private partnerships and
traditional contracting out. Survey failures result in findings only being able to
attempt a more general view of public-private partnerships. Results allow
perceptions to be placed in a decision-making model based on a project phase
approach that develops on the assumption that tasks contracted to private
vendors produce project consequences. Furthermore, analysis of significant
consequence perceptions indicate that those perceptions do not provide a
rationale for a procurement official’s decision-making on whether to contract
using a public-private partnership for public infrastructure projects. Independent
sample t-tests, controlled correlations, multiple ANOVA and linear regression
analyses show that perceptions of consequences, the perceptions of differences
of those consequences across project phases, relationships of consequences to
perceptions of efficiency and effectiveness proxies and a bounded rationalitybased
model of decision-making for procurement officials are all inconclusive.
Discussion focuses on the development of consequences and phases as
defining and clarifying public-private partnerships. Further discussions are
presented for procurement officials with respect to their decision-making and
possible role as policy implementers. Conclusions fail to uncover any inferential
results. The research finds its primary contribution in the conceptual discourse of
public procurement official roles and public-private partnership definitions.