Madura, Jeff

This dissertation examines the stock price behavior of newly public firms following two separate events, acquisition announcements and a large single day price change. For the first essay on overreaction, the changes in both liquidity and information are considered in studying the stock price reaction to a trigger of +/-15%. Over 2,600 events are evaluated for these newly public firms from 1992--2001 with events classified as occurring during either the quiet, lockup or post lockup period. For positive trigger events during the quiet period, a large one-day price change results in a significant underreaction. Positive triggers during the lockup period result in no significant abnormal returns, while a statistically significant overreaction occurs during the post lockup period. For negative triggers, while there are no significant abnormal returns for the reactions in any period, there is nevertheless a statistically significant difference between the reactions during the quiet and the post lockup periods. In addition, the degree of market reaction is found to be significantly different for events with information versus events without information. The second essay examines the stock price reaction when newly public firms make acquisition announcements. The belief is that these firms may experience a more positive reaction due to the firms' smaller size, need for immediate expansion, and increased corporate governance. On the other hand, these firms may lack the expertise to successfully integrate the acquisition targets. The results show that these newly public firms experience significant announcement returns of 2.63%. In general, higher announcement returns are found the smaller the acquirer, the smaller the relative size of the acquisition, and if the target is privately held. While the presence of venture capitalists and top tier underwriters result in lower announcement returns, returns are higher if the acquisition advisor is the same as the original underwriter. The buy and hold abnormal returns calculated using a matched sample are not significant. However, acquisitions with economies of scale for the motive have returns of 15% following one year, while those for economies of scope have -15% and the difference is significant.

Financial regulations require publicly traded firms to disclose firm-specific information relating to their financial performance as well as forecasts of future prospects disclosed to anyone outside the firm. Profit warnings present important market information as to the recent past firm performance as well as a glimpse into the firm's future prospects. By implementing Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD) in October 2000, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) attempted to change the information environment by reducing information asymmetry between analysts and the investing public. This dissertation examines the impact of Regulation (FD) as it relates to three specific areas. Essay One examines Regulation FD's impact on market reaction to profit warnings by U.S. firms and finds significant market reaction over a two-day announcement window. The analysis in this dissertation documents statistically significant changes in the extent of the market reaction in the pre- and post-Regulation FD periods. Evidence is also presented that indicates a significant reduction in information leakage (as measured by negative cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) in stock price for firms in the two-week period immediately prior to a profit warning. Essay Two focuses on American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) and examines differences in comparative market reaction (ADRs versus U.S. stocks) in the pre and post-Regulation FD periods. Essay Three tests the market reaction to profit warnings for commercial bank stocks in the pre- and post-Regulation FD periods with particular attention focused on the contagion effect. The empirical analysis in this dissertation seeks to answer the question of whether the implementation of Regulation FD successfully achieves the SEC's goal of reducing information asymmetry between analysts and investors.