Dividends

In Essay 1, I investigate the Equity Duration Hypothesis, which adapts Macaulay’s fixed income analysis to equity securities, finding evidence that dividend payers are less volatile than nonpayers and that dividend yield is negatively associated with volatility for the all-firms sample. Within the payer sample, however, I find unexpected evidence of a positive association when yield includes all dividends but a conflicting negative association when yield includes only quarterly dividends. This ambiguous evidence is corroborated by a one-year portfolio approach, as a previously strengthening negative relationship has transitioned to a strengthening positive one, with results demonstrably trending against the EDH in recent decades. I further find that high-yield stocks that have experienced negative price shocks are highly volatile and strong support for the EDH using firm-level earnings and cash flows as a proxy for dividends, allowing extension of the analysis to nonpaying firms. Unfortunately, I find abundant evidence supporting the assertions of many researchers who suggest that ED is not a unique asset pricing factor, but rather represents a composite of a firm’s characteristics and is redundant with other factors known to be associated with volatility.

Increasing evidence suggests the personal traits of chief executive officers (CEOs) can influence corporate policies. We examine how one dimension, past professional experiences, can affect corporate payout policy. Exploiting exogenous CEO turnovers and future employment, we hypothesize that CEOs experiencing a distress event in their past career alter the corporate payout policy at their subsequent firm of employment. We discover that CEOs having experienced prior professional career distress are less likely to pay dividends and use repurchases and pay out lower levels for each type of payout. Additionally, when CEOs with distress do have a payout policy greater than zero dollars, there exists a preference toward the use of repurchases in the payout policy, adding to the literature of substitution and differences between the two forms of payout. We find that dividend smoothing is reduced by CEOs that have past professional distress.

Essay I: Governance surrounding dividend initiation. According to the free cash flow hypothesis, managers prefer to invest surplus cash, even in value reducing projects, rather than release it to shareholders. Yet, previous studies of dividend payout conclude that managers pay more in dividends when they are entrenched, supporting the substitute model... The results indicate that initiating firms have stronger shareholder rights, in contrast with much of the prior research on continuous divident payout. Firms with lower entrenchment index are more likely to initiate dividends... Essay II: Earnings management surrounding dividend initiation. Prior research tests earnings management surrounding changes in dividend payout and researchers conclude that the earnings management is a means of amplifying the dividend signal to the market. However, dividend initiation is a unique event. If initiation represents signaling, similar to a dividend increase, then management will manage earnings upward. If, on the other hand, divident initiation is better explained by the free cash flow hypothesis, then initiation may be entered into with caution or reluctance by management.