Cognition in children

Using Dodge's (1986) social information processing model of social competence, we examined the interpretation of social cues in 48 third through sixth grade children classified on the dimensions of aggression and victimization. It was hypothesized that both aggressive and victim children would show interpretation (attribution) deficits or biases as compared to controls. In order to test this hypothesis, subjects were administered a series of short stories. Four of these scenarios depicted ambiguous provocations and three depicted ambiguous prosocial acts directed toward the subject. The stories were designed to measure the extent to which children made negative, blaming attributions in response to the stories. The results provided partial support for the prediction. While victim children manifested no biases, the aggressive children did possess a hostile attributional bias. It was suggested that these children are distinct from each other and may possess very different biases that account for the observed behavioral differences.

Cognitive theorists hypothesize two types of cognitive processes
(e.g., automatic and effortful) which may influence human information
processing. This thesis investigates age differences in when children
use intralist associative relationships (thought to be automatic in
nature) to identify other (categorical) relations. Use of conceptual/
categorical relations to organize recall is thought to be effortful in
nature. Sixty children each from grades 3, 5, 7, and 9 were presented
orally with lists of 20 words under free-recall instructions. Results
provide support for the position that recall memory of young children
is mediated primarily by associative rather than conceptual
relationships. Also, partial support was obtained for the three stage model of the development of organization proposed by Bjorklund and
Zeman (1982). However, the model's prediction of when children will
optimally use associative relationships to identify categorized
relations was inaccurate. These results indicate that older childrens'
recall can be facilitated by automatic cognitive processes resulting in
higher levels of clustering (organization) and recall.

The relationship between object-person permanence and
quality of attachment was assessed in 13 month old infants
under equivalent task conditions. Both familiar/salient
and unfamiliar/neutral objects and persons were hidden behind
large curtains. Contrary to previous findings securely
attached infants did not perform differently than insecurely
attached babies on the object and person permanence
scales. Regardless of security of attachment, babies
searched at a higher level for both the familiar/salient
person and object than for the unfamiliar/neutral person
and object. Infants were most likely to search for the
mother and least likely to search for the experimenter.
Results suggest that the motivational salience of target
persons and objects plays an important role in performance
on object and person permanence tests and thus indicate a
need for more precision in measurement in order to
delineate any existing relationship between the cognitive
and affective domains in infancy.

Developmental and socioeconomic status (SES) differences in classificatfon
styles indicate that young and low SES children are more likely
to sort objects nontaxonomically whereas older and middle SES children
are more likely to sort taxonomically. When children establish stable
organizational schemes (taxonomic or nontaxonomic), memory performance
is usually enhanced. Eighty-five kindergarten and first grade subjects
were divided into three socioeconomic groupings and given two sort/recall
tasks. For whites, recall was greater when subjects sorted to a
criterion of two identical sorts than it was when they sorted only
once, and white College subjects were more apt to sort the items
taxonomically than were children of other SES groupings. No significant
effects were found for blacks. Because the results revealed no
consistent differences in performance as a function of SES, it was
concluded that children of all SES levels can generate and use
organizational schemes to guide retrieval.

First and third grade children were asked to recall the names
of their classmates. Organization of recall was assessed
with regard to structures in the classroom (e.g. , seating
arrangements, reading groups). Following recall, children
were given a list of four possible strategies and asked to
select which, if any, they used. Levels of organization were
high and undifferentiated for first and third graders with
the majority of children being unable to select accurately
the strategy used in class recall as reflected by organization
(ARC) scores. Furthermore, the distribution of subjects accurately
identifying a strategy in this task was no greater
than th2t of subjects in an earlier experiment who were asked
to describe the strategy they used. These results indicate
that although children demonstrate high levels of recall and
organization on this task, they do not show comparable abilities
in strategy awareness, and that this is not due merely to
their inability to produce a verbal response.

Statistical analysis of test scores obtained from forty-one children
separated from the father during early life and their matched controls
provides support for the conclusion that the quality or type of
subject-object interaction in the caretaking environment effectively
contributes to one's concept of the self as involved in a world of other
selves and objects, as one other member of a social system. The
concepts of self and other are derived from the form of experience
which one has had in responding to others present. Conceptual thinking
emerges as a reflection upon objects known. Objects are known to the
self as a result of actions taken in response to a thing's good or
useful properties. Seen in this way, knowledge represents an
instrumental relation of knower to thing known.

This study examined the hypothesis that cognitive immaturity may serve an adaptive purpose for children at a time in ontogeny when they are not capable of ensuring their own survival. Participants were presented pairs of scenarios of 3- and 9-year-old children expressing either immature or mature cognition. Participants were asked to select the child (immature vs. mature) which best reflected each of 11 different psychological traits that were ultimately grouped into 3 trait dimensions: cute, deceptive, and smart. Participants received one of 6 pairs of scenarios reflecting examples of either intuitive cognition or nonintuitive cognition. Participants selected the immature child as being more cute and less deceptive than the mature child for the intuitive vignettes, but not for the nonintuitive vignettes. This pattern suggests that some forms of immature cognition do indeed bias adults to feel more favorably toward the children who express them and may foster positive parent-child relationship.

Bering and Bjorklund (2004) reported that (1) the knowledge that conscious mental states cease with the onset of death (discontinuity reasoning, "DR") emerges developmentally; and (2) DR for some states (emotions, desire, epistemic) is more difficult than others (psychobiological, perceptual). In the current study, preschool/kindergarteners, 2nd/3 rd graders, 5th/6th graders and adults viewed a puppet story in which an anthropomorphized juvenile mouse character was explicitly enriched with a variety of mental states prior to falling asleep; the results were highly similar to those of Bering and Bjorklund. Statistical comparison of these data with those of Bering and Bjorklund demonstrates that DR for emotions, desires and epistemic contents is equally difficult for both death and sleep, and suggests the influence of both simulation and implicit theoretical factors. An evolved adaptation designed to maintain vigilance in the presence of immobile agents, but that also likely underlies intuitive dualism (intentional persistence) is proposed.

The current emphasis in mathematics curricula is placed on mathematical applications to real-life word-problem solving. Therefore, it is critical that all secondary students receive instruction in problem solving. Although many mathematics textbooks provide steps for students to follow when solving word-problems they do not meet the needs of all students, especially those with learning disabilities (LD). Students with LD lack knowledge in cognitive and metacognitive strategies, although they are able to use these strategies when taught. The purpose of this study was to compare the effectiveness of a cognitive problem solving strategy and a traditional textbook method in solving three-step word-problems consisting of whole numbers, decimals, fractions, and percents. Four teachers who taught two Specific Learning Disabilities (SLD) math classes volunteered to participate in the study. Each teacher taught one of his/her math classes the cognitive strategy and the other class the textbook method. A total of 76 students from grades 9 through 12 who attended a part-time SLD math class were used as subjects. The two groups were taught through direct instruction with scripted lessons. The cognitive strategy group was taught an eight-step strategy that included self-talking and self-questioning. The textbook method group was taught a traditional textbook method which consisted of a four-step plan. Treatment for both groups included a pretest, describing and modeling the strategy or method, verbally rehearsing the cognitive strategy or textbook method, practice solving word-problems, and a posttest of the three-step word-problems. The results indicated that there were no significant differences between the cognitive strategy and textbook method. However, the observed power was not sufficient to determine if there was or was not a treatment effect. Informal error analyses indicated subjects did perform better after direct instruction in solving word-problems. Although subjects were attempting to solve more problems, however, other types of errors were being made, such as choosing and using the wrong operation. This indicates students may need to be taught a strategy on how to choose the correct operation to solve word-problems.

The purpose of this study was to investigate the justification of using Full Scale IQ scores as the principal means of determining whether adjudicated youths are as capable of engaging in higher-order thinking processes as youths in public schools. This study examined the performance of a group of adjudicated youths (N = 50) in a correctional training school and a comparative group in a public school district (N = 50) on 4 of 10 mandatory subtests which comprise the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC-R, WISC-III). The criteria for the subjective selection of subtests to be examined focused on choosing those which measured cognitive abilities and were not heavily influenced by acquired academic skills and socioeconomic factors. For each of the selected subtests, an inferential statistical analysis was made at a.01 level of significance using independent sample two-tailed t tests to compare the difference between the means of subtest scaled scores for subjects from the correctional training school and the public school district. The results of this analysis indicated that there was no significant difference between the cognitive abilities of the youths in the correctional training school and a comparative group in a public school district as measured by the selected subtests. This study supports the conclusion that the use of a Full Scale IQ score from a standardized intelligence test may not accurately reflect the individual cognitive abilities of adjudicated youth to engage in higher-order thinking processes. Recommendations were made for correctional educators to identify approaches which could be used that better target the higher-order thinking skills of an adjudicated youth population.