Tunick, Mark

The fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution states that all persons “born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof are citizens. The island of Puerto Rico has been a territory of the U.S. since 1898, after it was acquired following the conclusion of the Spanish-American War. Subsequently, the citizens of Puerto Rico are considered U.S. citizens, however, there are certain constraints to that citizenship. The Insular Cases, a series of Supreme Court Opinions from 1901, decided the status of the territories acquired following the conclusion of the Spanish-American War (i.e. Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines). Through these opinions, the Court created a distinction between incorporated and unincorporated territories. Despite their citizenship, citizens of unincorporated territories are not afforded the same rights and privileges of mainland citizens. In this paper, Puerto Rico will be used as a case study to determine not only the ethics of maintaining territories, but also the constitutionality of partial incorporation of such territories.

Notorious serial killer Jeffrey Dahmer terrorized and killed his victims in the 1980’s. Some argue that criminals like Dahmer who commit gruesome acts forfeit their right to be treated as a human being. I argue instead that while criminals like Dahmer should not be respected, they should be treated with dignity. Dignity is an inherent value assigned to a person because they are human beings. Respect, in the sense of admiration, is not inherently owed to all human beings. Respect is earned, and can be forfeited by criminals as a result of their wrongdoings. I propose ways that the American criminal justice system should be reformed so that we still treat criminals with dignity even if we don’t respect them.

The Voting Rights Act of 1965 expanded the 14th and 15th amendments by outlawing the discriminatory practices adopted by many southern states to keep many African Americans from voting. Section 4(b) of the VRA required that states with a previous history of voter suppression obtain federal preclearance before enacting any new voting laws. In 2013, the Supreme Court held in Shelby County v. Holder that the coverage formula in section 4(b) was unconstitutional. I argue that Shelby County has opened the door to numerous recent efforts to restrict voting. While these restrictions have been justified to counter illegal voting, I argue that the removal of preclearance has led to restrictions on voting that do not facilitate the integrity of voting, but ‘suppress voting,’ and have a disparate impact on minorities.

Voter turnout is an essential metric for the health of a democracy; however, our nation has a particularly low rate of voter turnout. This thesis explores the relationship between turnout and three factors that may affect it: voting habit, social pressure, and gerrymandering. In an effort to understand and boost turnout, political scientists have studied whether gerrymandering may decrease turnout by lowering voter efficacy and confidence. While evidence for this theory remains unclear, studies of the formation of voting habit and effects of social influence imply that turnout efforts with a normative approach may be more effective in raising voter participation long-term.

The coronavirus pandemic has upended our daily lives, especially regarding our civil liberties. With the development of a vaccine, many Americans are concerned about the possibility of vaccine mandates. Regardless of whether states should implement these mandates, the first question that needs to be answered is whether they can. Although the Supreme Court’s recent National Federation of Independent Business v. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration decision put an end to a vaccine mandate implemented through OSHA’s workplace safety standards, the possibility of state level mandates remains. Although there have been legal challenges to localized mandates, it is clear from Jacobson v Massachusetts that state vaccine mandates are constitutional.

The right to vote is a fundamental part of a representative democracy. As of 2020, 48 states have laws limiting a felon’s participation in the franchise, resulting in 5.2 million United States citizens being unable to vote. In 2018, Florida passed Amendment 4 with a 65% popular vote, allowing felons to be re-enfranchised after the terms of their sentence are completed. In 2019, the state enacted a law defining “terms of the sentence” to include court costs and fees, barring indigent felons from regaining their constitutional right. In Jones v. Governor of Florida, Judge Pryor upheld this law. I critically evaluate the majority and concurring opinions. I will argue the opinion is flawed for failing to use intermediate scrutiny, and by appealing to social contract theory, and theories of punishment. I argue that the law not only fails to serve a legitimate governmental interest, but undermines democracy, perpetuates racial disparities, and makes felons an unequal party in the social contract solely because of their indigent status.

The Social Contract details the liberties of members in society; those willing and able to consent to the contract were afforded the luxuries of protection and assistance through the government. I draw on the theory of Charles Mills in The Racial Contract, which argues that the black life was never intended to fit into the Social Contract. During the early stages of it’s inception, black people weren’t regarded as valid members who enter the contract. Disagreement about the validity of frustration felt by the Black community as a result of this exclusion has created a social and political divide. I document multiple instances in which black lives have been disregarded and undervalued. Drawing on John Locke’s Treatise of Two Governments regarding justified resistance when the government violates the Social Contract, I justify the resistance and outrage of the Black community and argue for a restructuring of another Social Contract, made to consider everyone.

Several studies reveal a connection between a victim’s skin color and the probability that
their aggressor will receive the death penalty. Other studies conclude that a defendant’s race will
be a factor in determining whether or not they are sentenced to capital punishment. Despite the
evident racial discrimination that plagues capital cases, Ernest van den Haag contends that
“unequal justice is still justice” and that if someone is guilty of a capital offense, they don’t
deserve any less punishment simply because the death penalty is applied disproportionately
based on race. I argue, against van den Haag, that unequal justice violates defendants’ rights to
due process. Even if a defendant is guilty, justice demands a fair system that protects defendants
from systemic injustice and treats all victims and defendants equally.

The Sixth Amendment of the Constitution guarantees all United States citizens the right to a fair trial. However, that right has not been made equally accessible to all defendants in the criminal justice system due to the underfunding of Public Defender’s offices nationwide. This thesis examines the impact of this underfunding on indigent criminal defendants and analyzes social psychology research to understand the psychological biases that help explain this underfunding, and how they might be overcome. Evidence suggests that the disproportionate government expenditure on the State Attorney and underfunding of the Public Defender has led to a skewed legal system that favors not only the prosecutor, but also the white, abled, and wealthy. I argue that to support a criminal justice system that aligns with the values of equality and justice, the Public Defender must be properly funded to fulfill its adversarial role.

There are several different normative ethical frameworks one can use for determining or
measuring the value of a human life, including deontological and utilitarian theories on
how we ought to make decisions regarding which lives have more value. I intend to evaluate
these frameworks and apply them to the problem of self driving cars, which pose
both ethical and legal issues. These cars will have to be programmed to make decisions in
the case of emergency situations, and the question of who and how we should be programming
these vehicles to best promote the common good is a difficult one. I will argue
that utilitarianism is the best way to make decisions in the case of choosing between 2
lives, and that self-driving cars should be programmed to do the least damage possible,
even if that means sacrificing the life of the passenger. In addition, I will argue for the
programming of self-driving cars to be uniform across manufacturers, with liability generally
falling on the manufacturer in cases of injury or malfunction.