Corporate governance

I examine the impact of real earnings management (REM) and corporate governance on cash holdings. Extant research documents an increase in both cash holdings and REM activity in recent years and shows that agency conflicts influence both the levels and valuations of cash holdings. Motivated by agency problems of REM and Jensen's (1986) arguments concerning the free cash flow problem, I investigate whether opportunistic asset sales and reductions in discretionary expenditures are associated with levels and valuations of cash holdings. Prior research also shows that strong corporate governance mitigates opportunistic earnings management behavior and enhances the valuation of cash holdings. Using empirical models from prior research, I document that REM is positively associated with cash holdings, investors discount cash holdings of high REM firms, and, among high REM firms, valuations of cash holdings of weak corporate governance firms are discounted significantly lower relative to those of strong corporate governance firms. My study unites two lines of research by incorporating agency problems concerning REM with levels and valuations of cash holdings.

This research explores the attitudes held by marketing managers about building their company's corporate reputation, and about the impact of their actions on performance. In an environment of costly brand building, declining customer loyalty, and increasing scrutiny from stakeholders who demand corporate responsibility and transparency, a concern for corporate reputation is increasingly important for everyone in the company, including marketing managers. The marketing literature, however, has not explored how managers who are concerned about the reputation of their companies can effectively adapt marketing strategy for reputation enhancement. The theoretical justification for this research is grounded in stakeholder theory, dynamic capabilities theory, and strategic choice theory. The study contributes to the marketing strategy literature and the nascent field of stakeholder marketing. It makes a theoretical connection between the corporate-level construct of reputation orientation, and its impact on functional-level decisions about marketing strategy. Reputation orientation is the concern that top management and employees share about their company's commitment to nurturing a positive corporate reputation among key stakeholders. A scale for reputation was conceptually defined and empirically tested (Churchill, 1979). It consists of three dimensions: consciously created corporate identity, internal identity dissemination, and external stakeholder impact. Reputation orientation was found to be a valid and reliable construct that was further tested within the framework of how marketing managers formulate, implement, and evaluate their strategic marketing decisions. This research also tested the impact of stakeholder-conscious marketing strategy on corporate reputation and marketing performance.

In the period leading up to the early 2000s there were a series of large company failures attributed at least in part to audit failures. Consequently, the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) was promulgated in July 2002 to restore confidence in public company financial reporting and the work of auditors. The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) was established by SOX and appointed as the regulator of the accounting firms that audit the financial statements of public companies. The PCAOB is required to routinely inspect the operations of these accounting firms in an effort to satisfy its mandate to bring about an improvement in the audit quality of these companies. These inspections extend to the non-US auditors of companies that are cross-listed in the US. Despite various mainly US studies on inspections, there is limited evidence that the inspections have resulted in improved audit quality. ... I examine companies whose securities are cross-listed in the US in the periods before and after inspection in order to provide evidence on the benefits of inspections. I find some evidence that inspections improve the audit quality of companies that are cross-listed in the US. This suggests the audit quality of companies from countries that do not permit inspections may be positively affected should inspections be permitted.

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act made audit committees directly responsible for the appointment, compensation, and supervision of companies' auditors. Limited research in the auditor selection process and PCAOB inspections suggest that managers, not audit committees, may still be selecting the auditors, and that inspection reports are not useful. This study addresses both of these areas. This paper considers two theories of governance, Agency Theory and Institution Theory, to analyze the audit committee members' auditor selection process. The study examines whether Audit Committee Members use two specific types of audit quality indicators, other than managers' recommendation, in evaluating auditors. In a setting where the manager recommends the auditor, the auditors' inspection results (favorable/unfavorable) and a prior manager/auditor affiliation (absent/present) are manipulated in a between-subject research design, using financially literate professionals as a proxy for audit committee members. The study finds that audit quality perception and auditor selection are jointly determined. Inspection results are positively associated with audit quality perception and auditor selection. The nature of a manager-auditor affiliation is directly associated with audit quality perception and inversely related to auditor selection. Further, controlling for perception, audit committee members are more likely to recommend auditors with unfavorable inspection results, if a prior affiliation with management is present than if an affiliation is absent. Overall, the results indicate that audit committee members are diligent in evaluating auditors, and PCAOB inspection results are useful. The results of this study contribute to the audit committee effectiveness and PCAOB literature.