Disclosure in accounting

Since 2005 corporate managers must discuss their firm’s significant risk factors that may materially and unfavorably affect corporate outcomes in the Item 1A Risk Factor Disclosure (RFD) section of their 10-K filings. However, there is limited research on whether firms change the sentiment of their mandatory disclosures after a significant economic event. I use bankruptcy announcements as a unique setting in this study to assess non-announcing firms’ responses to these events as a bankruptcy announcement generates significant concern to non-announcing industry peer firms. I explore whether industry peers change four measures of sentiment (i.e., length, negative tone, specificity, forward-looking statements) of Item 1A RFDs after a rival firm’s bankruptcy filing. Using textual analysis methodology, I find that industry peer firms have shorter, less negative, and less forward-looking RFDs after another firm’s bankruptcy announcement. These results imply that industry peers are likely to adjust their tone of mandatory filings (i.e., Item 1A RFDs) in response to a rival firm’s bankruptcy announcement. I further provide evidence that firms do not use separate subsections to disclose their firm- and industry-specific risks within their Item 1A RFDs. Lastly, the lengths of financial, litigation, other-idiosyncratic, and other-systematic topic disclosures significantly decrease for non-announcing industry peers while the length of tax relevant risk topic does not significantly change after a bankruptcy filing. This study adds to mandatory research by identifying the spillover effect of a bankruptcy announcement on Item 1A RFDs. This research also contributes to accounting literature by providing evidence that non-announcing industry peers significantly adjust the sentiment of their risk factor information. Market participants including investors, shareholders, and financial analysts can improve investment decision accuracy by analyzing the industry peers’ risk factor information.

I investigate the effects of requiring the audit engagement partner (EP) signature and individual EP’s quality on information asymmetry, analysts’ forecast errors and forecast dispersion. I predict and find that, ceteris paribus, there is a significant decline in information asymmetry, analysts’ forecast errors and forecast dispersion from the pre- to post-EP signature period in the UK over both of short-term (e.g., 2008-2010) and long-term (e.g., 2004-2014). These findings hold when using a control sample approach and a different proxy for the information asymmetry, which indicate that my results are not likely due to the effect of concurrent events and correlated omitted variables. These findings provide timely and important empirical evidence to the ongoing debate about whether the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board should pass a similar requirement in the U.S.

I examine how managerial reputation affects the quality of non-GAAP earnings
disclosures and how the market reacts to non-GAAP earnings disclosures associated with
managerial reputation. Although there was an initial dip in the frequency of non-GAAP
earnings disclosures after SOX and Regulation G, the frequency of non-GAAP earnings
disclosures has increased in recent years (Brown, Christensen, Elliott and Mergenthaler
2012). Motivated by the efficient contracting theory and managerial reputation
incentives, I investigate whether reputable managers are associated with higher quality
non-GAAP earnings disclosures. I also investigate whether the market is more responsive
to non-GAAP earnings disclosed by reputable managers. Using empirical models
modified from prior research, I find that reputable managers are less likely to disclose
non-GAAP earnings, which is consistent with the efficient contracting explanation. I also
find that reputable managers exclude more recurring items that are related to future
operating earnings when they disclose non-GAAP earnings, which is consistent with the rent extraction explanation in prior research. Finally, I find that managerial reputation has
an incremental effect on the market reaction and that the market is more responsive to
non-GAAP earnings disclosed by reputable managers if the unexpected earnings are
positive. The study contributes to both non-GAAP earnings disclosures literature and
managerial reputation incentives literature. It also has implications for investors,
managers, and regulators.

This study was prepared as the thesis required for the Master of
Business Administration Degree. Very little has been written on the
subject of delinquencies in the reporting of negotiated fringe benefit
contributions. Methods employed in the research include: interviews,
direct observation, questionnaires and research of records. Records
of fringe benefit trusts of three inter-related crafts of the plastering
industry (lathing, plastering and plaster tending) in Los Angeles
and Orange Counties, California, were examined. Comparative analyses
of union membership, employment statistics, hours reported for fringe
benefit trusts and actuarial assumptions were made. Arbitration and
judicial decisions were cited. After extensive analysis it was determined
that leakages of fringe benefit contributions have occurred in
significant amounts.

Auditor independence has been a long-standing issue for regulators resulting in numerous studies on the subject on how to enhance it and numerous rules that attempt to ensure it (e.g. Cohen Report 1978; ASR 250 1978; SEC Rule 2-01 2000). One of regulators' most recent attempts to shore up auditor independence is evident in the provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). As a test of two competing theories of auditor independence, and to determine whether SOX mandates have successfully enhanced financial reporting quality, I examine post-SOX changes in non-audit fees (as a proxy for changes in quasi-rents) and the extent of changes in two measures of financial reporting quality. Results suggest that SOX mandates have been effective, and that the proposition of DeAngelo (1981b) that non-audit services may impair auditor independence may more-closely describe the relationship between changes in quasi-rents and changes in financial reporting quality than does the theory of Lee and Gu (1998). Further, supplemental analyses suggest that, as proposed by the theories, the amount of low-balling is positively related to the amount of quasi-rents.

Dechow and Sloan [1991] investigate the hypothesis that CEOs, during their final years of office (the "horizon" years), manage discretionary expenditures to improve short-term earnings performance. Using a sample of 261 firm-years, this study extends the Dechow and Sloan model by including additional control variables. It also examines whether the discretionary components of earnings (discretionary accruals, discretionary revenue, and capital expenditures) provide departing CEOs a monetary incentive (bonuses) to manipulate these income factors. The general results of this study do not support the hypothesis that departing CEOs have a greater monetary incentive than incumbent CEOs to manage discretionary earnings to maximize their bonus schemes. A possible reason this hypothesis is not supported may be due to the fact that previous research has treated incumbent and departing CEOs as separate, homogeneous samples a treatment that the extant income-smoothing and CEO turnover research suggests may be flawed. Income smoothing literature provides evidence that some incumbent CEOs manipulate earnings to a predetermined target to avoid a "ratcheting" of expectations while CEO turnover research suggests that the "relay" process mitigates some departing CEOs' manipulations of earnings. Since agency theory predicts that management of accounting earnings will vary between groups of incumbent and departing CEOs, as well as within these two groups, the present study partitions the sample on the median change in operating cash flows for departing CEOs. This study finds evidence that departing CEOs in the above-median partition do increase income-enhancing discretionary accruals in their final year with the firm, and they have a significant economic incentive to do so. However, there is apparently no economic incentive for departing CEOs with an above-median change in operating cash flows to reduce discretionary revenue or capital expenditures.