Diversity

Model
Digital Document
Publisher
Florida Atlantic University
Description
In this manuscript, I present two essays which examine the role of diversity within the corporate boardroom.
The first essay determines that board compensation practices at competing firms influence the remuneration arrangements of directors. Consistent with the observational learning perspective, directors mimic the behavior of peer firms in setting their own compensation, but that diversity, in the form of gender, race/ethnicity, education, and experience moderates this relationship. Diversity also leads to better board performance measured through its impact on excess CEO compensation and CEO turnover sensitivity.
In the second essay, I document the presence of peer influence in diversity hires. As firms within an industry hire more women and minority directors, others will do the same. This type of herding behavior has both positive and negative outcomes. Firm stock and operating performance is worse in the years after a peer-driven diversity hire, yet board performance is better. I conclude that peer-driven decisions may be suboptimal, but that diversity can promote better governance in the boardroom.