Why security is but a symptom: understanding the persistence of state failure

Most international relations scholars focus on internal insecurity as the primary problem in a failed state. I disagree with that view, and instead I seek to show that insecurity is
created by rampant rule-breaking. Specifically, I argue that what I term “alegality” is the
primary institutional structure of failed states. An alegal system is one where rules are
written but seldom followed. An alegal system contains a government, so it cannot be
considered anarchic. Under such systems, rule-breaking eroded reciprocal rule-following
relationships, and this erosion removes constraints on behavior present in other societies.
Without these constraints, states are characterized by internal insecurity, few publiclyprovided
goods, a large and inefficient bureaucracy, and an autocratic leadership. Under
the assumption that leaders, bureaucrats, and individual citizens all seek to maximize
self-interest, I will show that their interactions within an alegal system result cause state
failure to persist indefinitely.