Jakee, Keith

We construct a formal model that reconciles non-formal risk-based Austrian business cycle theory with models of political business cycles. In our model, the incumbent political party induces the central bank to enact an expansionary monetary policy. This policy lowers the real interest rate, which leads to an increase in investments. As more individuals invest, assets inflate, leading to a boom-bust cycle; voter utility increases because asset values are higher. An increase in voter utility leads to an increased likelihood that the incumbent political party will be reelected. In an attempt to avoid a violent bust in assets, the central bank may implement a contractionary monetary policy to raise the real interest rate in increments. If the financial system becomes illiquid before the policy is implemented, then a speculative bubble burst occurs. The cycle regenerates a year before the next election when an accommodative monetary policy is implemented once again.

Arend Lijphart claims low voter turnout plagues democratic countries because it causes elections to be unrepresentative of the electorate. Therefore, he believes that compulsory voting is the only way to solve this ―unresolved dilemma.‖ Proponents of compulsory voting also argue that increased voter participation has positive effects on a country. This paper will not only evaluate the effects of compulsory voting on certain aspects of citizens’ welfare, but also citizens’ overall satisfaction with their life and government. In order to measure each of these elements, I will look at income equality, level of government corruption, and democracy ranking. I will also use the World Values Survey to compare the feelings of citizens towards their life and government in countries with compulsory voting to those of citizens in countries with voluntary voting. I hypothesize that there will not be significant differences between the two electoral systems.

In this study, I use a logistic regression to model the probability of an admitted applicant either enrolling into the Harriet L. Wilkes Honors College of Florida Atlantic University or declining admission. This institution is a small, selective liberal arts college and the case study spans an eleven year period (from 1999 to 2009). To construct my model, I examine variables such as level of academic performance, personal characteristics, geographic proximity to the institution, amount of financial aid offered, timing of admission decision, and contact with the college. I expect that students with the highest levels of academic performance, furthest distance from the college, and least amount of financial aid offered have a higher probability of declining admissions.

The existence of market bubbles raises questions about economists‘ long held assumptions of rationality, costless arbitrage, and the efficient market hypothesis. I take a
theoretical approach to the debate on market efficiency by modeling a ―no-value asset,‖
which are residential vacant lots that cannot be developed. I employ a data set that
naturally controls for a number of market characteristics thought to contribute to
inefficiency. I find that no-value assets traded persistently during the market upturn, in
the early 2000s, suggesting limits to arbitrage. In the absence of inefficiency-causing
market characteristics, the behavior of agents is likely the cause. To corroborate this
claim, I create an investor confidence index using a ratio of sales to stressed sales and
find that inefficiencies were present when investor confidence was high, supporting the
idea of “irrational exuberance” on the part of traders.

Loss prevention personnel in retail firms face difficult and expensive decisions regarding the technologies they should implement to reduce product loss and redistributive crime. Using Office Depot as a case study, this paper evaluates redistributive crime, which is the tendency for theft of unprotected products to increase when surveillance systems are placed on protected ones. I also analyze the security measures used to combat these crimes, focusing mainly on the Electronic Article Surveillance systems and the product loss for a single high-risk department as compared to several standard departments. My results allowed for the calculation of a loss prevention equilibrium point, where the cost of loss prevention is equal to its benefits when using the Alpha boxes for the ink department.

I argue that widespread use of criminal background checks has a privacy implication and fosters unjust punishment for ex-offenders. A criminal conviction has a twofold effect on the offender: judicial punishment in the form of court fees, incarceration, and similar court orders that temporarily restrict individual liberty; and non-judicial punishment in the form of social stigmatization attached to an arrest and/or conviction that marginalize the offender from society. Background checks indefinitely hinder reintegration by inhibiting the ex-offenders’ ability to obtain employment, housing and social acceptance. Permitting widespread use of background checks mismanages the intersection of privacy rights for the ex-offender and the 1st Amendment. I conclude by suggesting that a revised system modeled after European criminal background procedures would create a better balance between the ex-offender’s right to privacy and society’s interest in accessing public facts.

Several countries are experiencing a new demographic trend called “population aging” that can significantly impact housing markets. Countries such as the United States and Japan are observing their share of elderly people expand. I use regression analysis to determine the relationship between house prices and population in the United States and Japan to assess the impacts of populating aging on housing. I then use the parameters estimated by the regression analyses along with population projections for the period 2015-2050 to simulate house price trends for these two countries. These regression and simulation tests merge aspects of past models on population aging and housing, compare the effects of population on real house prices in the United States and Japan, and support the claim that population aging lowers real house prices. The results of my model also predict that, compared to the United States, Japan’s real house prices will fall more dramatically.

During the past recession, house prices plummeted to record lows. However, empirical research shows that, on average, property tax revenues for local governments have not decreased. My paper will attempt to explain this paradox by arguing that an information asymmetry exists in the process used by local authorities to assess and tax private properties. I use Palm Beach County, FL as a case study to illustrate my hypothesis. This information asymmetry, characterized by the lack of transparency in the property assessment and taxation process, is exploited by local government to conceal its revenue-maximizing behavior. The analysis of this behavior, captured through the lens of the Leviathan model, allows us to uncover the moral hazard at play whereby local governments seek to maximize their revenues through ways obscure and elusive to the general public.

Most international relations scholars focus on internal insecurity as the primary problem in a failed state. I disagree with that view, and instead I seek to show that insecurity is
created by rampant rule-breaking. Specifically, I argue that what I term “alegality” is the
primary institutional structure of failed states. An alegal system is one where rules are
written but seldom followed. An alegal system contains a government, so it cannot be
considered anarchic. Under such systems, rule-breaking eroded reciprocal rule-following
relationships, and this erosion removes constraints on behavior present in other societies.
Without these constraints, states are characterized by internal insecurity, few publiclyprovided
goods, a large and inefficient bureaucracy, and an autocratic leadership. Under
the assumption that leaders, bureaucrats, and individual citizens all seek to maximize
self-interest, I will show that their interactions within an alegal system result cause state
failure to persist indefinitely.

Football (soccer) performance is commonly believed to be based on player talent and franchise finances. However, there may be factors exogenous to football influencing football performance. The aim of this study is to show that on-field performance is influenced not only by the usual factors such as player talent and franchise finances, but also by factors such as the wealth of the nation, the size of the population, the degree to which football is part of the culture, and taxation policies. Using regression analysis as the main method to substantiate my claim, this study will focus on the performance of leagues in comparison to their counterparts in other nations. I will limit the scope of the study to leagues affiliated with the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA).