Environmental Regulation Stringency and Voluntary Environmental Disclosure

I examine the relationship between environmental regulation stringency and the extent of voluntary environmental disclosures by firms. The study draws on theoretical frameworks including legitimacy theory, stakeholder theory, and information asymmetry, to explore how different mechanisms influence firm behavior in the context of environmental transparency.
My empirical analysis shows a positive relationship between the stringency of environmental regulations and the level of voluntary environmental disclosures. This relationship is weakened by factors such as board independence and institutional ownership. I further confirm the positive effect of national level of environmental regulation stringency on the environmental voluntary disclosure. However, I fail to find supporting evidence on the positive moderating role of national level of environmental regulation stringency and corporate governance. In contrast, I find evidence that external institutional ownership and independent directors, who represent interests of external blockholders, have a preventive and monitoring effect on the main relationship to reduce the threat of misleading voluntary information and proprietary cost.