Vincent, Jack E.

This experiment was an extension of the SMH, and Vincent-Tindell games. The major purpose was to investigate the effects of two different
ratios of shock on escalation-de-escalation ancl other aspects of aggressive-cooperative behavior. In one condition (inequality) one player
began game play with 6 shocks, the other player began with 18 shocks. In
the other condition (equality) both players began game play with 13 shocks
apiece. Players were allowed to purchase additional shocks or surrender
any number of shocks. Forty-nine game play variables were generated, representing indices of aggressive or cooperative behavior. The relationships of these variables to additional independent variables such as game plan, grade point average, and attitudinal scores were also examined. The findings of this experiment indicate that the balanced (equality)
conditions tend to generate more purchasing behavior and a higher overall
level of aggression. The unbalanced (inequality) condition however,
generated more extreme forms of behavior. Those with 18 shocks were generally more aggressive than all other players, and those with 6 shocks (inequality) were generally more cooperative than all other players. These findings conflicted with the results of the previous Tindell-Vincent game, but it seems that the addition of the purchasing option radically altered the effects of treatment condition. Sex was found to be a good predictor of game behavior. females were generally more cooperative and less active than males. Game plan and, to a lesser extent, attitude scores had predictive value for several responses, but grade point average, as expected, was a poor predictor of game behavior.

There are many theories in the field of international relations
that relate the level of aggression in the international
system to the distribution of power among nations. Unfortunately,
most such propositions are difficult to validate or refute in the
real world for which they were formulated. For this reason an
experiment was devised which attempted to east two such conflicting
positions, "balance of power", and "preponderance of power",
into testable form. The experimental paradigm employed was a modified version of the
two person mixed-motive game developed at the Systems Analysis
Corporation, Santa Monica, California. Fifty-four subjects participa
ted in the experiment. Twenty-seven subjects were placed into
each of three treatment conditions: "balance of power": "moderate-inequality
of power"; and "preponderant-inequality of power". In
the "balance of power" condition all subjects were allotted twenty
shocks. In the "moderate- inequality of power condition" one subject
received twenty- five shocks while his dyadic partner received fifteen
shocks. In the "preponderant-inequality of power" one subject
received thirty shocks while his dyadic partner received ten shocks.
All subjects played a total of fifteen games. A count was made
of each subjects responses on eight game-play variables which were
viewed as indices of cooperative or aggressive behavior. Additional data were also gathered with respect to each subjects sex,
academic aptttude and attitudinal attributes. The purpose of the
additional data was to identify variables, other than the treatment
condition, affecting game behavior. Thus, facilitating future
experimentation. The results of this research indicate that balanced situations
tend to produce more cooperative non-aggressive behavior, while imbalances
of power tend to generate less cooperative and more aggressive behavi.or. In addition, a balanced situation, when compared
to the imbalanced situations, was found to increase the likelihood
of participants never employing shock capabilities. Both this experiment
and a pilot experiment found de-escalation cycles diffficult
to instigate and unlikely to develop from natural causes.
Finally, attitudinal, sex, and SCAT data did not appear to be meaningful factors in explaining game play. However, post-experiment
sample data indiciated these factors must receive continued attention
in future research.

The present research examines the proportions of the general expenditures of the nation's largest cities allocated for various functions of government. It is the intent of the research to determine whether the difference in proportions allocated to these functions may be predicted in terms of demographic and socio-economic attributes of the cities. Essentially, the research will be concerned with determining the degree of correlation between the dependent variables (the allocations) and the independent variables (the attributes) and explaining as much of the variance in the subject's spending patterns as is possible.

This study empirically tests Model II of Social Field
Theory, a model elaborated by R. J. Rummel in the Dimensionality
of Nations (DON) project at the University of
Hawaii. The basic assumptions of this empirical theory
are specified and the methodological considerations for
transforming the sample data and testing the theory are
presented in detail. Comparisons are made of the findings
of this research to previous and similar empirical studies
in international relations. The results of the tests cf
Hodel II of Social Field Theory on 128 nation subjects and
twenty international groups are presented and analyzed.
Interpretations and policy implications are specified on
the basis of these findings.

This thesis examines if characteristics of a foreign nation's economic, social and foreign policy affect U.S. policy makers foreign aid allocation decisions. The three years of 1981, 1985, 1988 were studied. There were several theories that were taken form previous literature that could be grouped generally into humanitarian interests and donor interests that were used to determine the rationale behind the U.S. foreign aid allocation. There were two stages in the study, the first asked: what are the characteristics of nations most likely to receive aid from the U.S.? The second stage asked among nations receiving aid, which attributes--humanitarian interests or donor interests--are associated with greater amount of aid?

This study empirically tests two new theories of international relations
elaborated by Jack E. Vincent as "Relative Status-Field Theory" and
"Distance Theory." The findings are compared with empirical results
for R. J. Rummel's "Attribute," "Social Field," and "Status-Field"
Theories. The cowman philosophical foundation of the theories is discussed,
and the basic assumptions and expectations of each theory are
specified. The data and methodological procedures necessary for testing
the theories are considered. Suggestions for further theoretical development
and testing are given. An elementary knowledge of statistics is
required, although some knowledge of multi-variate analysis would be
helpful.