Balance of power

This experiment was an extension of the SMH, and Vincent-Tindell games. The major purpose was to investigate the effects of two different
ratios of shock on escalation-de-escalation ancl other aspects of aggressive-cooperative behavior. In one condition (inequality) one player
began game play with 6 shocks, the other player began with 18 shocks. In
the other condition (equality) both players began game play with 13 shocks
apiece. Players were allowed to purchase additional shocks or surrender
any number of shocks. Forty-nine game play variables were generated, representing indices of aggressive or cooperative behavior. The relationships of these variables to additional independent variables such as game plan, grade point average, and attitudinal scores were also examined. The findings of this experiment indicate that the balanced (equality)
conditions tend to generate more purchasing behavior and a higher overall
level of aggression. The unbalanced (inequality) condition however,
generated more extreme forms of behavior. Those with 18 shocks were generally more aggressive than all other players, and those with 6 shocks (inequality) were generally more cooperative than all other players. These findings conflicted with the results of the previous Tindell-Vincent game, but it seems that the addition of the purchasing option radically altered the effects of treatment condition. Sex was found to be a good predictor of game behavior. females were generally more cooperative and less active than males. Game plan and, to a lesser extent, attitude scores had predictive value for several responses, but grade point average, as expected, was a poor predictor of game behavior.

There are many theories in the field of international relations
that relate the level of aggression in the international
system to the distribution of power among nations. Unfortunately,
most such propositions are difficult to validate or refute in the
real world for which they were formulated. For this reason an
experiment was devised which attempted to east two such conflicting
positions, "balance of power", and "preponderance of power",
into testable form. The experimental paradigm employed was a modified version of the
two person mixed-motive game developed at the Systems Analysis
Corporation, Santa Monica, California. Fifty-four subjects participa
ted in the experiment. Twenty-seven subjects were placed into
each of three treatment conditions: "balance of power": "moderate-inequality
of power"; and "preponderant-inequality of power". In
the "balance of power" condition all subjects were allotted twenty
shocks. In the "moderate- inequality of power condition" one subject
received twenty- five shocks while his dyadic partner received fifteen
shocks. In the "preponderant-inequality of power" one subject
received thirty shocks while his dyadic partner received ten shocks.
All subjects played a total of fifteen games. A count was made
of each subjects responses on eight game-play variables which were
viewed as indices of cooperative or aggressive behavior. Additional data were also gathered with respect to each subjects sex,
academic aptttude and attitudinal attributes. The purpose of the
additional data was to identify variables, other than the treatment
condition, affecting game behavior. Thus, facilitating future
experimentation. The results of this research indicate that balanced situations
tend to produce more cooperative non-aggressive behavior, while imbalances
of power tend to generate less cooperative and more aggressive behavi.or. In addition, a balanced situation, when compared
to the imbalanced situations, was found to increase the likelihood
of participants never employing shock capabilities. Both this experiment
and a pilot experiment found de-escalation cycles diffficult
to instigate and unlikely to develop from natural causes.
Finally, attitudinal, sex, and SCAT data did not appear to be meaningful factors in explaining game play. However, post-experiment
sample data indiciated these factors must receive continued attention
in future research.

Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) witnessed a profound process of adaptation and change. In conjunction with the pursuit of new missions, one of the key elements of the alliance's transformation has been the enlargement to the East. This paper examines the issue of NATO's post-Cold War enlargement in the broader context of its adaptation to the new particularities of the international security environment. The paper suggests that changes in the alliance's mission and in the U.S. interests influenced the politics of enlargement and, consequently, the policy toward candidate countries. Romania's unexpected admission into NATO in the second round illustrates this aspect. A content analysis performed on The New York Times reveals that this newspaper's attitude toward enlargement has changed from negative in the first round to positive in the second round and that it portrayed Romania negatively in both rounds. In addition, the NYT coverage of the candidate countries was not always objective but reflected the U.S. official policy.