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The literature on voter turnout focuses on the determinants of the electorate’s
vote supply. There is growing recognition, however, that the
demanders of votes—candidates, political parties, and interest groups—have
strong incentives to invest resources in mobilizing support on Election Day.
The authors test the hypothesis that corruption rents increase the value of
holding public office and, hence, elicit greater demand-side effort in building
winning coalitions. Analyzing a pooled time-series data set of public officials
convicted of misusing their offices between 1979 and 2005, we find, after controlling
for other influential factors, that governmental corruption raises
voter turnout rates in gubernatorial elections.
vote supply. There is growing recognition, however, that the
demanders of votes—candidates, political parties, and interest groups—have
strong incentives to invest resources in mobilizing support on Election Day.
The authors test the hypothesis that corruption rents increase the value of
holding public office and, hence, elicit greater demand-side effort in building
winning coalitions. Analyzing a pooled time-series data set of public officials
convicted of misusing their offices between 1979 and 2005, we find, after controlling
for other influential factors, that governmental corruption raises
voter turnout rates in gubernatorial elections.
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