Venture capital

My first study proposes that stock price manipulation erodes trust, damages corporate reputation, reorients management towards short-termism, harms entrepreneurial innovation culture, and increases the cost of capital. I tested these ideas by linking stock manipulation data to corporate venture capital data for firms listed on NASDAQ and NYSE. The data indicate CVC investments in entrepreneurial firms are followed by a rise in market manipulation in the short run [-3 months, +3 months], but a decline thereafter. The data further indicates that stock manipulation harms the ability of CVCs to form investment syndicates and reduces the likelihood of successful IPO and acquisition exits. The hazard rate to IPO is 0.54 for CVC-backed firms that face market manipulation. Overall, the theory and evidence provide insights into how firm's manipulation can damage the effectiveness of their venture capital endeavors, ultimately contributing to sustainable growth and innovation.

The modern organization is “a nexus of contracts” among various stakeholders. In this two-essay study, I examine how contracts surrounding entrepreneurial firms, namely contracts with the U.S. government agencies as customers and contracts with venture capital (VC) firms as investors, interact.
In the first essay, I examine whether and how the ex-post government contracting activity of portfolio companies affects the performance of VC investments. Prior research establishes the impact of government customers on the contractor's operating performance and information quality. I find that government contracting improves the likelihood of successful exits via initial public offering (IPO) or acquisition and reduces the likelihood of a liquidation. I also find that the suppliers’ bargaining power relative to the government moderates the relationship between government contracting and VC investment exits. The increased suppliers’ bargaining power mitigates the positive relationship between government contracting and the likelihood of IPOs. The impact of government contracting on the likelihood of acquisitions and liquidations is more substantial for suppliers with greater bargaining power. The results are robust for reputable and non-reputable VC firms, alternative model specifications, and adjustments for potential endogeneity.

I investigate if all-equity firms are a heterogeneous group as it relates to agency costs and accounting quality. All-equity firms are a unique group of firms that choose a “corner solution” as their capital structure. Extant research, supported by well-established theories such as trade-off theory, free cash flow theory, and Jensen’s (1986) control hypothesis, generally conclude that agency conflicts motivate such structure. Research also supports the alternative argument that poor accounting quality makes debt so prohibitive that such firms are driven to this capital structure. I propose that an all-equity structure is not necessarily symptomatic of agency conflicts and poor accounting quality overall. I investigate if different motivations, within an all-equity setting, reflected by free cash flows and growth opportunities, result in different levels of agency cost and accounting quality. By anchoring on theories that link implicit costs of debt to free cash flow levels and growth opportunities, I hypothesize that free cash flows and growth opportunities are strongly linked to the justification or lack thereof for the pursuit of such strategy. I hypothesize and show that firms in the extremes of the free cash flow to growth rate spectrum exhibit significantly different levels of agency cost and accounting quality within the all-equity setting. These results support my main prediction that there exists agency costs and accounting quality differences within the all-equity setting which are associated with free cash flow levels and growth opportunities and that the pessimistic conclusions for pursuing an all-equity strategy reached by prior research should not be generalized to all such firms.