Model
Digital Document
Publisher
Florida Atlantic University
Description
The modern organization is “a nexus of contracts” among various stakeholders. In this two-essay study, I examine how contracts surrounding entrepreneurial firms, namely contracts with the U.S. government agencies as customers and contracts with venture capital (VC) firms as investors, interact.
In the first essay, I examine whether and how the ex-post government contracting activity of portfolio companies affects the performance of VC investments. Prior research establishes the impact of government customers on the contractor's operating performance and information quality. I find that government contracting improves the likelihood of successful exits via initial public offering (IPO) or acquisition and reduces the likelihood of a liquidation. I also find that the suppliers’ bargaining power relative to the government moderates the relationship between government contracting and VC investment exits. The increased suppliers’ bargaining power mitigates the positive relationship between government contracting and the likelihood of IPOs. The impact of government contracting on the likelihood of acquisitions and liquidations is more substantial for suppliers with greater bargaining power. The results are robust for reputable and non-reputable VC firms, alternative model specifications, and adjustments for potential endogeneity.
In the first essay, I examine whether and how the ex-post government contracting activity of portfolio companies affects the performance of VC investments. Prior research establishes the impact of government customers on the contractor's operating performance and information quality. I find that government contracting improves the likelihood of successful exits via initial public offering (IPO) or acquisition and reduces the likelihood of a liquidation. I also find that the suppliers’ bargaining power relative to the government moderates the relationship between government contracting and VC investment exits. The increased suppliers’ bargaining power mitigates the positive relationship between government contracting and the likelihood of IPOs. The impact of government contracting on the likelihood of acquisitions and liquidations is more substantial for suppliers with greater bargaining power. The results are robust for reputable and non-reputable VC firms, alternative model specifications, and adjustments for potential endogeneity.
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