Model
Digital Document
Publisher
Florida Atlantic University
Description
This paper explores the phenomenon of urban insurgent warfare. A case study concerning the use of urban
insurgent and counter-urban insurgent warfare in Palestine
by the British Mandatory Government and Jewish urban insurgent
organizations (the Irgun Zvei Leumi and the Lohmey
Heruth Israel) from 1943 to 1948 is employed as a means to
both test and create hypotheses concerning the use of
urban insurgent and counter-insurgent warfare. The Palestine case is reviewed and then classified
within the terminology of revolutionary change. The terms
revolution, revolutionary war, guerrilla warfare and insurgent
terrorism are defined for the above purpose. T he
Palestine case is shown to be an example of urban guerrilla
revolutionary warfare. The traditional hypothesis concerning the ability
of an urban insurgent organization to operate against the
repressive abilities of a modern government is presented
and shown to be in contradiction to the historical data
of the Palestine case. New hypotheses are then formulated
to account for the events of the Palestine case. The
Palestine case is analyzed as to both the reasons for the
failure of the governmental counter-urban insurgent campaign and the reasons for the success of urban insurgent
actions in Palestine.
insurgent and counter-urban insurgent warfare in Palestine
by the British Mandatory Government and Jewish urban insurgent
organizations (the Irgun Zvei Leumi and the Lohmey
Heruth Israel) from 1943 to 1948 is employed as a means to
both test and create hypotheses concerning the use of
urban insurgent and counter-insurgent warfare. The Palestine case is reviewed and then classified
within the terminology of revolutionary change. The terms
revolution, revolutionary war, guerrilla warfare and insurgent
terrorism are defined for the above purpose. T he
Palestine case is shown to be an example of urban guerrilla
revolutionary warfare. The traditional hypothesis concerning the ability
of an urban insurgent organization to operate against the
repressive abilities of a modern government is presented
and shown to be in contradiction to the historical data
of the Palestine case. New hypotheses are then formulated
to account for the events of the Palestine case. The
Palestine case is analyzed as to both the reasons for the
failure of the governmental counter-urban insurgent campaign and the reasons for the success of urban insurgent
actions in Palestine.
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