Hao, Lizhong.

I examine the presence of earnings management at pre-IPO and lockup periods. Motivated by significant post-lockup insider sales documented in prior research, I investigate whether insiders (managers and venture capitalists) inflate earnings around the lockup period in order to increase share price and maximize personal wealth from selling shares at lockup expiration. I also compare levels of earnings management in the pre-IPO and lockup periods with those in the post-lockup period. Prior research also documents that auditor quality mitigates earnings management behavior. I explore the impact of auditor quality in the unique setting of IPO lockups. ... Cross-sectional analysis reveals that my sample IPO firms also utilize real-activities manipulation, but only in the early pre-IPO period. The results are robust with respect to alternative abnormal accruals and real-activities measures. I also find that IPO firms that hire prestigious auditors experience less earnings management in the lockup period than firms with lower-quality auditors, after controlling for the monitoring role of venture capitalist and underwriter reputation.