Industrial management

The study examines the potential threat to an auditor’s independence in fact which
may result from the extraordinarily favorable personal reputation (superstar status) of an
audit client’s CEO This potential threat to an auditors’ independence is the result of a
halo effect bias which can distort an individual’s judgment and behavior Accounting
firms use a business risk audit approach which involves conducting a strategic risk
assessment which assesses the overall threats to the business model of an audit client
Prior research has demonstrated that the strategic risk assessment can bias the judgment
of auditors pertaining to financial account level risk assessments For example, the Bernie
Madoff Ponzi scheme demonstrated how an extraordinarily well respected individual
with superstar status can distort the judgment of knowledgeable and normally skeptical
individuals An experiment was conducted to examine the potential threat of a superstar
CEO on an auditor’s independence as demonstrated by the ability to distort the judgment of the auditor during the performance of the strategic risk assessment In addition, the
experiment was designed to examine whether the halo cognitive bias can lessen the
impact that an auditor’s professional skepticism has on his or her judgment and behavior
during the audit of a client’s financial statement Unlike other studies which have sought
only to demonstrate that a cognitive bias exist which impairs auditor judgment; the study
also examined whether the influence of a halo effect bias can be mitigated by the formal
rating of audit evidence in a similar manner that was used by Embu and Finley (1977) to
successfully mitigate a framing effect
The experiment did not support the main hypothesis of the study that auditors
assess the strategic risk at a lower risk level for firms that employ a superstar CEO than
for those whom employ a non-superstar CEO This result may primarily be due to the
inability of the scenario used in the experiment to sufficiently differentiate the
characteristics of the superstar and non-superstar CEO Without establishing that the
participants’ judgment was being distorted by a superstar CEO; the other hypotheses
which involved testing a debiasing method to mitigate the halo effect caused by a
superstar CEO and investigating whether a halo effect reduces the impact that auditors’
trait skepticism level has on their judgment could not be properly tested

I examine how managerial reputation affects the quality of non-GAAP earnings
disclosures and how the market reacts to non-GAAP earnings disclosures associated with
managerial reputation. Although there was an initial dip in the frequency of non-GAAP
earnings disclosures after SOX and Regulation G, the frequency of non-GAAP earnings
disclosures has increased in recent years (Brown, Christensen, Elliott and Mergenthaler
2012). Motivated by the efficient contracting theory and managerial reputation
incentives, I investigate whether reputable managers are associated with higher quality
non-GAAP earnings disclosures. I also investigate whether the market is more responsive
to non-GAAP earnings disclosed by reputable managers. Using empirical models
modified from prior research, I find that reputable managers are less likely to disclose
non-GAAP earnings, which is consistent with the efficient contracting explanation. I also
find that reputable managers exclude more recurring items that are related to future
operating earnings when they disclose non-GAAP earnings, which is consistent with the rent extraction explanation in prior research. Finally, I find that managerial reputation has
an incremental effect on the market reaction and that the market is more responsive to
non-GAAP earnings disclosed by reputable managers if the unexpected earnings are
positive. The study contributes to both non-GAAP earnings disclosures literature and
managerial reputation incentives literature. It also has implications for investors,
managers, and regulators.

This thesis reports on how companies compensate
employees. It deals with the factors that influence direct
and indirect compensation and what special benefits and perquisites
are made available to wage and management employees.
A multiplicity of influences plays upon any determination
of wages for the individual and the organization.
These forces vary so in their impact that any static approach
to wage criteria is misleading.
The executive employee's compensation must contain
both financial and non-financial elements designed to supply
the urge, stimulus, and encouragement to improve profit performance
and enhance the growth, expansion, and progress of the company.
Since each form of compensation has both advantages
and disadvantages they must be carefully weighed if they are
to meet the short-term and long-term objectives of both the
company and the employee.

The problem of the study was to investigate tho relative
importance of various factors which influence tho now plant
site selection decision, Tho study method of inquiry was
employed using a questionnaire survey which was sent to two
populations--a group of chemical operations and selected
companies from the Fortune 500 list, Primary emphasis was
placed on human resource considerations. In summary, it appears
that human resources and related considerations have now moved
to the forefront of relative significance in the new plant site
selection decision.

Contemporary finance theory suggests that the appropriate goal of the management of a corporation should be to maximize the contribution of the shareholder's ownership in the corporation to the shareholder's wealth. A related objective of the firm's management that is consistent with this prime objective should be to minimize the cost of all inputs into the firm's income producing process. This would include minimizing the cost of the capital required to fund the firm's operations. This study examines the cost of debt to firms issuing new debt. Using a sample of new debt issues between 1988 and 1993 drawn from a listing compiled by the Capital Markets Division of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, this study finds that when underwriters are categorized by recent (last year) experience, the issuing firm's choice of an underwriter does not affect the offering yield required of the issuer in excess of several benchmark yields. Excess yield is tested with respect to 3-month treasury bills, 10-year constant maturity treasury securities, the average contemporary yield on AAA rated corporate bonds, and the average contemporary yield on new corporate issues carrying the same rating. The results do suggest that the issuing firm's choice of underwriter does affect the underwriter spread that the issuer will be charged. The implication of the results to corporate issuers of new debt is that choosing an experienced underwriter (defined in the study as having appeared in the listing of the top ten underwriters of corporate debt reported by Wall Street Journal in the previous year) could lead to reduced overall net interest costs stemming from the reduced underwriter spread.

I examine the impact of real earnings management (REM) and corporate governance on cash holdings. Extant research documents an increase in both cash holdings and REM activity in recent years and shows that agency conflicts influence both the levels and valuations of cash holdings. Motivated by agency problems of REM and Jensen's (1986) arguments concerning the free cash flow problem, I investigate whether opportunistic asset sales and reductions in discretionary expenditures are associated with levels and valuations of cash holdings. Prior research also shows that strong corporate governance mitigates opportunistic earnings management behavior and enhances the valuation of cash holdings. Using empirical models from prior research, I document that REM is positively associated with cash holdings, investors discount cash holdings of high REM firms, and, among high REM firms, valuations of cash holdings of weak corporate governance firms are discounted significantly lower relative to those of strong corporate governance firms. My study unites two lines of research by incorporating agency problems concerning REM with levels and valuations of cash holdings.

In Essay I, I analyze the impact of the target and bidder reference points on the probability of acquisition under general economic conditions as well as in strong/weak economic periods. I find that the target and the bidder reference points have a significant impact on the probability of a firm becoming a bidder or a target. While the target reference point also has a significant impact on the successful completion of the merger, the bidder reference point does not. In addition, I find that the target reference point is a significant determinant of management-led buyout mergers, while the bidder reference point has a significant impact on the probability of the bidder launching a hostile bid. In Essay II, I focus on the impact of the target and bidder reference points on the method of payment in the context of what the target seeks, what the bidder offers, and what the two parties use as their final method of payment. The analysis is performed under general economic conditions and in strong/weak economic periods. I find that while the target reference point has a strong impact on the method of payment agreed upon between the two parties, the bidder reference point does not. This is especially important given that the bidder reference point influences the consideration offered by the bidder but does not translate into a significant impact on the final method of payment. In essay III, I examine the impact of bidder reference point on public targets and the impact of bidder and target reference points on private firms. I analyze the aforementioned relationships under different economic conditions. Consistent with the literature on premium and public targets, I find that the target reference point has a strong and positive relationship with the premium paid for private firms. The relationship is stronger in weak economic times.

This research explores the attitudes held by marketing managers about building their company's corporate reputation, and about the impact of their actions on performance. In an environment of costly brand building, declining customer loyalty, and increasing scrutiny from stakeholders who demand corporate responsibility and transparency, a concern for corporate reputation is increasingly important for everyone in the company, including marketing managers. The marketing literature, however, has not explored how managers who are concerned about the reputation of their companies can effectively adapt marketing strategy for reputation enhancement. The theoretical justification for this research is grounded in stakeholder theory, dynamic capabilities theory, and strategic choice theory. The study contributes to the marketing strategy literature and the nascent field of stakeholder marketing. It makes a theoretical connection between the corporate-level construct of reputation orientation, and its impact on functional-level decisions about marketing strategy. Reputation orientation is the concern that top management and employees share about their company's commitment to nurturing a positive corporate reputation among key stakeholders. A scale for reputation was conceptually defined and empirically tested (Churchill, 1979). It consists of three dimensions: consciously created corporate identity, internal identity dissemination, and external stakeholder impact. Reputation orientation was found to be a valid and reliable construct that was further tested within the framework of how marketing managers formulate, implement, and evaluate their strategic marketing decisions. This research also tested the impact of stakeholder-conscious marketing strategy on corporate reputation and marketing performance.

I investigate the association between independent directors' monitoring roles as distinguished by whether they reside on the audit committee (ACs) or not (NACs) and their respective ownership and whether Section 301 or a proxy for alternative independent monitoring (the percentage of institutional ownership) affects this relation. Specifically, I examine whether the objectivity required of serving as an AC (consistent with their audit function role) or alignment with investors (consistent with agency theory) dominates in determining independent directors' level of share ownership. Using generalized estimations of equations I provide evidence that ACs hold less ownership than NACs that suggests differences with respect to independence in appearance/ alignment with shareholder interests not previously documented amongst independent directors. I also find evidence that Section 301 may contribute to this differential ownership while the presence of institutional ownership moderates this relationship.

Many factors contribute to the outcome of an acquisition; these factors arise from both the objective of the target and acquirer. This dissertation focuses on how the bidding strategy, acquirer and target characteristics impact the transaction. The first essay examines how the timing and size of the acquirer's bid for a U.S. target firm impacts their return. I find that successful first and low bid acquirers experience significantly larger returns than successful secondary and non-low bid acquirers. The cross-sectional analysis determines that higher levels of target institutional ownership and acquisitions completed prior to the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley result in reduced returns to the acquirer. In addition, the likelihood of a successful first bid acquirer increases with a revised bid and when the acquirer is both the first and low bid acquirer simultaneously. The likelihood of a successful first bid acquirer decreases as the number of bidders increases and as the bidding process lengthens. I also find that the likelihood of a successful low bid acquirer increases the longer the bidding process. The second essay examines how the timing and size of the acquirer's bid for an international target impacts their return. I find that successful first and low bid acquirers experience insignificant abnormal returns following the acquisition announcement. In addition, the likelihood of a successful first bid acquirer increases when the acquirer and target have similar cultures, with higher levels of target government corruption and when the acquirer is both the first and low bid acquirer simultaneously. The likelihood of a successful low bid acquirer decreases with higher levels of target government corruption. I also examine what factors affect the target premium and find that larger transactions and successful first bid acquirers increase the target premium.