Financial services industry

In essay I, I empirically examine theoretical inferences of real options models regarding the effects of business risk on the pricing of firms engaged in corporate control transactions. This study shows that the risk differential between the merging firms has a significant effect on the risk dynamic of bidding firms around control transactions and that the at-announcement risk dynamic is negatively related to that in the preannouncement period. In addition, the relative size of the target, the volatility of bidder cash flows, and the relative growth rate of the bidder have significant explanatory power in the cross-section of announcement returns to bidding firm shareholders as does the change in the cost of capital resulting from the transaction. Essay II provides an empirical analysis of a second set of real options models that theoretically examine the dynamics of financial risk around control transactions as well as the link between financial leverage and the probability of acquisition. In addition, I present a comparison of the financial risk dynamics of firms that choose an external growth strategy, through acquisition, and those that pursue an internal growth strategy through capital expenditures that are unrelated to acquisition.

In the period leading up to the early 2000s there were a series of large company failures attributed at least in part to audit failures. Consequently, the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) was promulgated in July 2002 to restore confidence in public company financial reporting and the work of auditors. The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) was established by SOX and appointed as the regulator of the accounting firms that audit the financial statements of public companies. The PCAOB is required to routinely inspect the operations of these accounting firms in an effort to satisfy its mandate to bring about an improvement in the audit quality of these companies. These inspections extend to the non-US auditors of companies that are cross-listed in the US. Despite various mainly US studies on inspections, there is limited evidence that the inspections have resulted in improved audit quality. ... I examine companies whose securities are cross-listed in the US in the periods before and after inspection in order to provide evidence on the benefits of inspections. I find some evidence that inspections improve the audit quality of companies that are cross-listed in the US. This suggests the audit quality of companies from countries that do not permit inspections may be positively affected should inspections be permitted.

Research linking marketing to financial outputs has been gaining significance in the marketing discipline. The pertinent questions are, therefore: how can marketing improve measures of firm performance and draw potential investors to the company, and where is the quantitative proof to back up these assertions? This research investigates the role of marketing expenditures in the context of initial public offerings (IPOs). The proposed theoretical framework comes from marketing and finance literature, and uses econometric models to test the hypotheses. First, we replicate the results of a previous study by Luo (2008) showing a relationship between the firm's pre-IPO marketing spending and IPO underpricing. Next, we extend the previous study by looking at the IPO's long-run returns, types of risk, analyst coverage, and market/industry characteristics. The results of this study, based on a sample of 2,103 IPOs from 1996 to 2008, suggest that increased marketing spending positively impac ts firm performance. We examine different measures of firm performance, such as risk and long-run performance, whose results are important to the firm, its shareholders, and potential investors. This study analyzes the impact marketing spending has on IPO characteristics (IPO underpricing in the short-run and cumulative abnormal returns in the long run); risk characteristics (systematic, unsystematic, bankruptcy risk, and total risk); analyst coverage characteristics (the number of analysts, optimistic coverage, and forecast error) and market characteristics (market volatility and industry type). We control for variables such as firm size, profitability, and IPO characteristics. In this paper, the results show that increased marketing spending lowers underpricing, lowers bankruptcy risk, lowers total risk, leads to greater analyst coverage, leads to more favorable analyst coverage, and lowers analyst forecast error. For theory, this paper advances the literature on the

I investigate the association between large shareholder heterogeneity and firms' accounting quality and information asymmetry. Specifically, I construct three measures of ownership heterogeneity based on the type, size, and monitoring aggressiveness of large shareholders present in a firm. Applying these three measures of heterogeneity, I examine whether large shareholder heterogeneity is associated with the variation in firms' accounting quality and information asymmetry. I also examine new block formations to provide evidence on the consequences of large shareholder investment on firms' accounting quality and information asymmetry. I find that the monitoring aggressiveness of large shareholders is positively associated with firms' accounting quality and information asymmetry. These findings suggest that large aggressive shareholders constrain earnings management, but contribute to firms' overall information asymmetry. Further, using new blockholder data, I find that investments by large aggressive shareholders are positively associated with firms' accounting quality and firms' information asymmetry in the post investment period. This finding provides additional support to my hypotheses that large shareholders play an important role in firms' accounting quality and information asymmetry.

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act made audit committees directly responsible for the appointment, compensation, and supervision of companies' auditors. Limited research in the auditor selection process and PCAOB inspections suggest that managers, not audit committees, may still be selecting the auditors, and that inspection reports are not useful. This study addresses both of these areas. This paper considers two theories of governance, Agency Theory and Institution Theory, to analyze the audit committee members' auditor selection process. The study examines whether Audit Committee Members use two specific types of audit quality indicators, other than managers' recommendation, in evaluating auditors. In a setting where the manager recommends the auditor, the auditors' inspection results (favorable/unfavorable) and a prior manager/auditor affiliation (absent/present) are manipulated in a between-subject research design, using financially literate professionals as a proxy for audit committee members. The study finds that audit quality perception and auditor selection are jointly determined. Inspection results are positively associated with audit quality perception and auditor selection. The nature of a manager-auditor affiliation is directly associated with audit quality perception and inversely related to auditor selection. Further, controlling for perception, audit committee members are more likely to recommend auditors with unfavorable inspection results, if a prior affiliation with management is present than if an affiliation is absent. Overall, the results indicate that audit committee members are diligent in evaluating auditors, and PCAOB inspection results are useful. The results of this study contribute to the audit committee effectiveness and PCAOB literature.

I investigate whether and how auditors address the potential risk of CEO incentive pay and CEO incentives from their equity portfolio as an incentive to commit fraud through their pricing decisions. Using an OLS regression model I find that auditors price CEO incentive pay in the post SOX period. Also, auditors price CEOs' non-linear incentives from their holdings of stock options as a fraud risk factor but do not price linear incentives from CEO holding of stock and restricted stock. Furthermore, auditors consider CEO incentives to manipulate firm performance due to the vested portion of option holdings as a fraud risk factor which is priced, and not the unvested portion of this portfolio. Furthermore, I find evidence to suggest that auditors price CEO opportunity to commit fraud, as well as CEO rationalizing the act of committing fraud, therefore concluding that auditors price all components of the fraud triangle.