Large shareholder heterogeneity

I investigate the association between large shareholder heterogeneity and firms' accounting quality and information asymmetry. Specifically, I construct three measures of ownership heterogeneity based on the type, size, and monitoring aggressiveness of large shareholders present in a firm. Applying these three measures of heterogeneity, I examine whether large shareholder heterogeneity is associated with the variation in firms' accounting quality and information asymmetry. I also examine new block formations to provide evidence on the consequences of large shareholder investment on firms' accounting quality and information asymmetry. I find that the monitoring aggressiveness of large shareholders is positively associated with firms' accounting quality and information asymmetry. These findings suggest that large aggressive shareholders constrain earnings management, but contribute to firms' overall information asymmetry. Further, using new blockholder data, I find that investments by large aggressive shareholders are positively associated with firms' accounting quality and firms' information asymmetry in the post investment period. This finding provides additional support to my hypotheses that large shareholders play an important role in firms' accounting quality and information asymmetry.