Investment analysis

Researchers of Initial Public Offerings, IPOs, have, traditionally, filtered out low-priced stocks with cut-off prices depending on individual study. This study examines underpricing, short- and long-run performance of one special class of such low-priced stocks. I examine IPOs filed for and issued as Penny Stocks, as defined by the amended SEC Act of 1990. The study finds average first-day excess returns of 128% over a benchmark NASDAQ Decile 1 Index. The excess returns on nonpenny IPOs issued on the same markets as the penny stocks are 7.6% over the S&P 500 Index. Cross-sectional analyses show that lower-priced penny stocks and stocks of smaller firms are more highly underpriced. Consistent with the information asymmetry hypothesis, penny stocks that were issued on the pink sheets are more highly underpriced than those on the more exposed and more regulated environments of the NASDAQ Small Capitalization markets and the OTC markets. The short- and long-run performance analyses show that, in general, penny stocks have a high performance of between 18% to 20% raw returns in the first year of issue but that declines sharply after a 13-month period. I find an 11-month optimal holding period over which an investor could maximize his returns in a portfolio of penny stocks. I further show that a passive buy-and-hold investment in penny stocks held longer than this optimal period can be a poor investment but an actively-managed penny-stock portfolio can outperform comparable benchmark portfolios of various market indexes on both raw and risk-adjusted basis. Penny stock issuers have shifted from public issues to private placement since 2001. I examine the return to investors in these private issues during the lockup period or until those issues eventually end up in the public domain. The average annualized return to investors during the lockup period is 229%, with only 5% of those issues recording negative returns. Investors who bought these stocks immediately after the lockup period, however, experience an 11% drop in value but the trend reversed after about 10 months, indicating a better long-run performance than those initially issued on the public markets. I examine the effect of the Penny Stock Reform Act (1990) on the number of sanctions that were imposed on the penny stock issuers. The policy intervention analysis shows that the number of sanctions dropped by 9% in the immediate aftermath of the enactment of the Act but increased significantly by nearly 4.7% per quarter thereafter.

Information leakage before full acquisitions has been widely documented. The information leakage, and the resulting pre-bid runup in the target's stock, generally increases the total cost of the acquisition. That is, information leakage and the ensuing pre-bid runup is a gain to the target and loss to the acquirer. Herein, I first ascertain the characteristics of full acquisitions that affect the amount of information leakage. I find that if the acquirer borrows to finance the acquisition then information leakage is greater. Further if the acquirer is foreign, if the target is a high-tech firm, and if the target has options on its stock all increase information leakage. I find hostile deals are effective in reducing information leakage. Lastly, information leakage increases in the percentage of managerial ownership. I next hypothesize that the identity and intent of partial acquirers is known to market participants before the announcement of a partial acquisition. I find that the market can anticipate whether a partial acquirer intends to fully-acquire or take an active role in the management of the target. Also, the market anticipates whether the acquirer is a private investment find or a non-financial corporation. Further, the acquirer's identity or intent is fully reflected in the target's stock price before the announcement of the partial acquisition. These results help explain why there are few partial acquisitions as precursors to full acquisitions.

I examine the presence of earnings management at pre-IPO and lockup periods. Motivated by significant post-lockup insider sales documented in prior research, I investigate whether insiders (managers and venture capitalists) inflate earnings around the lockup period in order to increase share price and maximize personal wealth from selling shares at lockup expiration. I also compare levels of earnings management in the pre-IPO and lockup periods with those in the post-lockup period. Prior research also documents that auditor quality mitigates earnings management behavior. I explore the impact of auditor quality in the unique setting of IPO lockups. ... Cross-sectional analysis reveals that my sample IPO firms also utilize real-activities manipulation, but only in the early pre-IPO period. The results are robust with respect to alternative abnormal accruals and real-activities measures. I also find that IPO firms that hire prestigious auditors experience less earnings management in the lockup period than firms with lower-quality auditors, after controlling for the monitoring role of venture capitalist and underwriter reputation.

Essay I: Governance surrounding dividend initiation. According to the free cash flow hypothesis, managers prefer to invest surplus cash, even in value reducing projects, rather than release it to shareholders. Yet, previous studies of dividend payout conclude that managers pay more in dividends when they are entrenched, supporting the substitute model... The results indicate that initiating firms have stronger shareholder rights, in contrast with much of the prior research on continuous divident payout. Firms with lower entrenchment index are more likely to initiate dividends... Essay II: Earnings management surrounding dividend initiation. Prior research tests earnings management surrounding changes in dividend payout and researchers conclude that the earnings management is a means of amplifying the dividend signal to the market. However, dividend initiation is a unique event. If initiation represents signaling, similar to a dividend increase, then management will manage earnings upward. If, on the other hand, divident initiation is better explained by the free cash flow hypothesis, then initiation may be entered into with caution or reluctance by management.

As a consequence of financial analysts' joint role as information intermediaries and firm monitors, I investigate analysts' responses to opportunistic corporate earnings management as firm mispricing increases. While firms' management have capital markets and executive equity incentives to manage earnings, financial analysts have trading volume, investment banking, and management information incentives which result in analysts' optimism bias. However, prior research also finds that analysts have reputational incentives, which motivate them to provide accurate and profitable outlooks. Using a generalized linear model (GLM), I estimate analysts' stock recommendation (price targets) responses for earnings management firms. I use the residual income model to compute fundamental value and I add proxies for earnings management to my analyst-responses models.... The main implications of my findings are that analysts use corporate earnings management and firm fundamental value in their stock recommendations (price targets) responses. In addition, my results provide evidence that, after controlling for earnings quality, analysts' stock recommendations (price targets) are consistent with strategies based on residual income models. These findings will be of interest to shareholders, regulators, and researchers as well as to finance and accounting practitioners.

Research linking marketing to financial outputs has been gaining significance in the marketing discipline. The pertinent questions are, therefore: how can marketing improve measures of firm performance and draw potential investors to the company, and where is the quantitative proof to back up these assertions? This research investigates the role of marketing expenditures in the context of initial public offerings (IPOs). The proposed theoretical framework comes from marketing and finance literature, and uses econometric models to test the hypotheses. First, we replicate the results of a previous study by Luo (2008) showing a relationship between the firm's pre-IPO marketing spending and IPO underpricing. Next, we extend the previous study by looking at the IPO's long-run returns, types of risk, analyst coverage, and market/industry characteristics. The results of this study, based on a sample of 2,103 IPOs from 1996 to 2008, suggest that increased marketing spending positively impac ts firm performance. We examine different measures of firm performance, such as risk and long-run performance, whose results are important to the firm, its shareholders, and potential investors. This study analyzes the impact marketing spending has on IPO characteristics (IPO underpricing in the short-run and cumulative abnormal returns in the long run); risk characteristics (systematic, unsystematic, bankruptcy risk, and total risk); analyst coverage characteristics (the number of analysts, optimistic coverage, and forecast error) and market characteristics (market volatility and industry type). We control for variables such as firm size, profitability, and IPO characteristics. In this paper, the results show that increased marketing spending lowers underpricing, lowers bankruptcy risk, lowers total risk, leads to greater analyst coverage, leads to more favorable analyst coverage, and lowers analyst forecast error. For theory, this paper advances the literature on the

I investigate the association between large shareholder heterogeneity and firms' accounting quality and information asymmetry. Specifically, I construct three measures of ownership heterogeneity based on the type, size, and monitoring aggressiveness of large shareholders present in a firm. Applying these three measures of heterogeneity, I examine whether large shareholder heterogeneity is associated with the variation in firms' accounting quality and information asymmetry. I also examine new block formations to provide evidence on the consequences of large shareholder investment on firms' accounting quality and information asymmetry. I find that the monitoring aggressiveness of large shareholders is positively associated with firms' accounting quality and information asymmetry. These findings suggest that large aggressive shareholders constrain earnings management, but contribute to firms' overall information asymmetry. Further, using new blockholder data, I find that investments by large aggressive shareholders are positively associated with firms' accounting quality and firms' information asymmetry in the post investment period. This finding provides additional support to my hypotheses that large shareholders play an important role in firms' accounting quality and information asymmetry.

The Market Timing - Buy and Hold (MT-BH) is introduced, tested against widely accepted performance models of market timing and tested if implamentation is possible. The MT-BH metric measures the condition of engaging in market timing strategies relative to buy and hold investing across an equity market. The metric provides an alternative explanation to why market timing results of investors and managers vary through time and across different equity markets. This dissertation examines how the is correlated with traditional market timing measures of the Treynor and Sharpe ratios over the 1995-2010 time period and how it affects widely used measures of regression based market timing models of Treynor- Mazuy and Henriksson-Merton. The Market Timing - Buy and Hold (MT-BH) metric can be applied to any equity market over any time period to condition the market timing skill of money managers in any equity market around the world. The final accomplishment of this dissertation is to determine if readily available finance and macro-economic variables can help investors determine which years are more favorable to pursue market timing strategies and which years favor buy and hold investing. When real GDP growth rates, inflation rates and PE ratios were low or negative and when dividend yields were high, market timing strategies were favorable across 44 country market indexes from 1994-2008. These results were robust to country level of development, negative market return years and other control variables. The conditions for pursing market timing strategies were time variant and detectable with macro-economic and finance variables. The MT-BH metric allows investors and brokers to determine when to switch from buy and hold investing to a market timing strategy using macro-economic and financial variables and helps to explain why market timing skill of managers is rarely found to be persistent.

A generally illegal form of short selling in United States equity markets, called "naked shorting," occurs when a seller of stock sells shares that do not exist. This type of short selling has negative consequences that result from the tactic's ability to be used as a tool to artificially inflate an issuer's stock supply, which introduces significant harm to the integrity of the market's natural forces of supply and demand. Newly adopted amendments to the Securities and Exchange Commission's short sale governance regulation, called Regulation SHO, required the mandatory purchasing of shares by certain market participants in order for those participants to close-out previously excused delivery failures, called "grandfathered" failures. This study examines the consequences of this new regulation, in terms of share price and volume, for those few securities that had the most persistent delivery failure problems. Because the regulation mandates the purchase of shares by certain influential market participants, I examine if the stock markets of these securities exhibited unusual volatility which may be indicative of the market maker trying to cover at low cost. Using technical analysis techniques, such as volume surge detection (using moving volume averages), the performance of the target securities will be compared with appropriate benchmark indices for the purpose of detecting unusual activity. Unusual activity may be consistent with my hypothesis that market makers may encourage additional volatility to cause liquidity problems for marginal investors which forces them to sell part or all of their position. As discussed in great detail, the extra marginal shares injected into the market by the action of forced selling by these marginal investors may be used by the market makers to lower their cost of regulation compliance.