Managerial reputation and Non-GAAP earnings disclosures

I examine how managerial reputation affects the quality of non-GAAP earnings
disclosures and how the market reacts to non-GAAP earnings disclosures associated with
managerial reputation. Although there was an initial dip in the frequency of non-GAAP
earnings disclosures after SOX and Regulation G, the frequency of non-GAAP earnings
disclosures has increased in recent years (Brown, Christensen, Elliott and Mergenthaler
2012). Motivated by the efficient contracting theory and managerial reputation
incentives, I investigate whether reputable managers are associated with higher quality
non-GAAP earnings disclosures. I also investigate whether the market is more responsive
to non-GAAP earnings disclosed by reputable managers. Using empirical models
modified from prior research, I find that reputable managers are less likely to disclose
non-GAAP earnings, which is consistent with the efficient contracting explanation. I also
find that reputable managers exclude more recurring items that are related to future
operating earnings when they disclose non-GAAP earnings, which is consistent with the rent extraction explanation in prior research. Finally, I find that managerial reputation has
an incremental effect on the market reaction and that the market is more responsive to
non-GAAP earnings disclosed by reputable managers if the unexpected earnings are
positive. The study contributes to both non-GAAP earnings disclosures literature and
managerial reputation incentives literature. It also has implications for investors,
managers, and regulators.